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Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 
While the procedural history of this case is complicated, the issues are simple. 
Joel Evans served in the Army during the first Gulf War in 1991. He began receiving 
Veterans Affairs disability benefits ("VA benefits") in June 1999. Upon returning from 
the Gulf War, Mr. Evans resumed his duties as a Salt Lake City police officer until he 
became disabled from his job with the City in 2001. In October 2001, Mr. Evans applied 
for disability benefits under Salt Lake City's disability ("the Plan55), which is 
administered by Educators Mutual Insurance Company. 
Educators ultimately determined that Mr. Evans qualified for the following 
benefits: 2/3 of his salary paid monthly for 24 months, less amounts Mr. Evans received 
in monthly federal VA benefits. Mr. Evans' counsel failed to appeal Educators' 
determination within the appeal period, and Mr. Evans provided no good cause to extend 
the appeal period. Instead, his counsel explained that he had incorrectly calendared the 
appeal deadline. Educators rejected the appeal because it was untimely under the Plan. 
During the time. Mr. Evans failed to disclose his VA benefits, Educators overpaid 
$8,510.78 in benefits. Educators filed this lawsuit to recover those payments. Mr. Evans 
filed a counterclaim, and a third-party complaint against the City, claiming that (i) later 
statutes preclude offsetting VA benefits; (ii) his disability resulted from "on duty" 
injuries, so benefits should equal his full salary; and (iii) benefits should extend beyond 
24 months because his disability prevents him from holding any and all occupations. 
The district court dismissed the contract claims against the City because 
Mr. Evans failed to arbitrate them first as required under the Plan. The court then 
adjudicated identical claims against Educators. The court dismissed (i) Mr. Evans' first 
1 
two claims concerning the offset and amount of benefits because his appeal was untimely 
and (ii) his third claim concerning the duration of benefits because Mr. Evans failed to 
provide Educators required medical information. The court then entered judgment in 
favor of Educators on its overpayment claim. 
Issue 1: Whether an independent plan administrator acts arbitrarily and 
capriciously in rejecting an employee's appeal of a decision concerning benefits where 
the employee, represented by counsel, fails to appeal the decision within the Plan's 
express 30-day appeal period. 
Issue 2: Whether an independent plan administrator acts arbitrarily and 
capriciously in rejecting an employee's contention that his disability prevents him from 
holding any and all occupations where the employee fails to provide medical records 
required under the disability plan. 
Standard of Review: Although this court can affirm under any standard of 
review, it is noteworthy that Mr. Evans incorrectly applies a correctness standard. (AOB 
at 3.) When reviewing an entry of summary judgment, this court applies the same 
standard as the district court. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, 
f 13, 70 P.2d 904. Educators has found no Utah cases stating the standard for reviewing 
an independent plan administrator's determination of disability benefits under a 
government plan, but the court has two choices under Utah law, neither of which is 
correctness. 
This court could apply the standard of review applicable to the Utah State 
Retirement Board's decisions under the State disability benefits program in the Utah 
Code. Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9-102 et seq. (2001). This court employs a deferential 
standard as long as the board provides "written documentation which demonstrates that 
the interpretation or definition promotes uniformity in the administration of the systems 
or maintains the actuarial soundness of the systems, plans or programs." Sindt v. 
Retirement Bd., 2007 UT 16, ^  5, 157 P.3d 797. Here, Educators enforced a uniform 30-
day appeal deadline and a universally applicable requirement that Mr. Evans provide 
information relevant to his disability. Thus, if this court were to consider Educators to be 
similar to the Retirement Board, the court should apply an abuse of discretion standard. 
However, as a private, independent plan administrator interpreting a contract and 
not a statute, Educators differs importantly from the Retirement Board. This court should 
therefore follow the federal standard of review applied in reviewing decisions of 
independent plan administrators, even though the Plan here is not governed by ERISA. 
29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2009); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, f 16 & n.2, 1 
P.3d 1074. Federal courts review a plan administrator's denial of benefits under an 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard and consider only the arguments and evidence before 
the administrator to determine: (i) whether substantial evidence supports the decision; 
(ii) whether the decision is based on a mistake of law; and (iii) whether the administrator 
conducted its review in bad faith or under a conflict of interest. Finley v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 379 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2004). An administrator's decision need not 
be the only logical one and will be upheld unless it lacks any reasonable basis. Id. 
Issue 3: Whether a district court's dismissal of contract claims because a 
disability plan required the claims to be arbitrated is moot where the district court later 
considers the merits of, and rejects, identical claims. 
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Standard of Review: Whether an issue is moot presents a question of law. Cedar 
Mountain EnvtL Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48, ^  7, 214 P.3d 95. 
Determinative Provisions 
Determinative provisions are attached at Addendum B. 
Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case 
At issue in this case is whether Mr. Evans complied with the terms of his disability 
plan with Salt Lake City when he disputed the benefits he received under the Plan. 
Mr. Evans challenges Educators' decisions that (i) Mr. Evans qualifies for benefits 
equaling 2/3 of his salary because his disability does not stem from his service as a police 
officer; (ii) Mr. Evans' benefits under the Plan may be offset by his VA benefits; and 
(iii) Mr. Evans is entitled to benefits for only 24 months because his disability does not 
prevent him from holding any job. This appeal involves whether Educators correctly 
(i) rejected Mr. Evans' appeal concerning the first two decisions because Mr. Evans, 
represented by counsel, failed to submit his appeal within the time period specified under 
the Plan and (ii) denied Mr. Evans' request to alter the third decision because Mr. Evans 
failed to submit medical information required under the Plan. 
II. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Evans participated in the City's disability plan while he served as a police 
officer. Mr. Evans' date of injury for purposes of determining disability was October 22, 
2001. (R. 948, 950-53.) When Mr. Evans applied for disability benefits under the Plan, 
Educators processed that application as the City's independent plan administrator. 
(R. 504-05.) 
A. The Plan 
Under the Plan, the duration of disability payments varies with the extent of the 
disability. The Plan authorizes payments for 24 months where an employee's disability 
prevents him from performing his occupation, and beyond 24 months where the 
employee "is disabled from performing any and all occupations." (R. 959.) 
The amount of a monthly disability benefit payment varies with the origin of the 
disability. "The benefit is 100% of covered monthly salary for eligible employees whose 
disability occurs in the line of duty, reduced by any other income." (R. 957.) In contrast, 
the "benefit is 66 2/3% of covered monthly salary for eligible employees whose disability 
occurs off duty, reduced by any other income." (R. 957.) 
The amount of a monthly disability payment also varies with the employee's other 
sources of disability income. Any payment under the Plan is offset "dollar for dollar by 
income received from . . . Armed Services retirement or disability programs" or from any 
"employer paid public or private retirement or disability program for which the employee 
is eligible."1 (R. 957, 958.) Under the Plan, Mr. Evans had a duty to "notify the City or 
Educators of any awards or determinations by or from any of the agencies, departments, 
or programs regarding payments to the covered employee." (R. 957.) In the event 
Mr. Evans failed to inform Educators of such payments, Educators could "recover 
overpayments." (R. 957.) 
That offset provision is consistent with the Utah Code at the time, which mandated that 
a "monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or due 
to, the employee from . . . armed services retirement or disability programs." Utah Code 
Ann. §49-9-402(2001). 
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B. Mr. Evans' Disability Claim Under the Plan 
In a letter dated September 10, 2002, Educators approved Mr. Evans5 "disability 
benefits due to Degenerative Disc Disease/Chronic Pain for 24 months only." (R. 109.) 
In the approval letter, Educators informed Mr. Evans that his disability did not preclude 
him from holding any and all occupations, but only from serving as a police officer. 
(R. 110.) The letter also stated that Mr. Evans had a duty to inform Educators within 30 
days of any other benefits, e.g., federal disability benefits. (R. 109.) Finally, the letter 
informed Mr. Evans that "[i]t will be your responsibility to write to us within 30-days if 
you disagree with any of the decisions made on your claim." (R. 110.) 
On October 3, 2002, Educators informed Mr. Evans that the Department of 
Veterans Affairs had notified Educators that Mr. Evans was receiving $2,440.00 per 
month in disability benefits stemming from Mr. Evans' service in Iraq. (R. 112.) 
Educators reminded Mr. Evans of his duty to inform Educators of the effective date of the 
VA benefits so Educators could offset Mr. Evans' benefits by that amount. (R. 112.) 
C. The Appeal Procedure under the Plan 
The Plan contains express procedures for reviewing Educators' benefit decisions. 
(R. 963.) To appeal an initial decision, an employee requests review by the Claims 
Review Committee within 60 days of the decision. (R. 963.) To appeal a Claims Review 
Committee decision, an employee requests review by the Board of Directors within 30 
days. (R. 963-64.) The Plan makes clear the importance of these deadlines: "No action 
at law or in equity may be brought against the City, Educators, or the Plan Administrator, 
and no arbitration request may be made, until the covered employee has exhausted the 
Claims Review Process as provided in this Plan." (R. 963.) 
In addition, an employee has a continuing obligation to provide Educators "any 
information relevant to his disability." (R. 958.) Under the Plan, disability payments will 
end on the "date the covered employee fails to furnish The City or Educators satisfactory 
proof that he continues to be totally disabled." (R. 960.) 
D. Mr. Evans Fails to Appeal Timely Educators' Decision 
On October 7, 2002, Mr. Evans timely requested that Educators reconsider its 
initial decision. Mr. Evans challenged whether (i) his disability resulted from off-duty 
activities; and (ii) his benefits under the Plan should be offset by his VA benefits. 
(R. 115-16.) Mr. Evans did not appeal the determination that his benefits would last only 
24 months. (Id) 
In considering Mr. Evans' request, Educators received an independent medical 
opinion from Jayne Clark, M.D. on December 5, 2002. (R. 300, 311.) Dr. Clark 
concluded that (i) given the nature of Mr. Evans' injuries, Educators would be justified in 
offsetting Mr. Evans' benefits by his VA benefits; and (ii) Mr. Evans' disability is caused 
by "natural degenerative processes of the spine regarding his neck and potentially Gulf 
War associated neurologic disorder." (R. 311.) On December 11, 2002, Educators 
informed Mr. Evans that the independent medical opinion confirmed its initial decision, 
and if Mr. Evans wished to appeal that decision to the Claims Review Committee, he had 
60 days to do so. (R. 120.) On January 15, 2003, Educators informed Mr. Evans that he 
needed to set up a repayment schedule to repay amounts he had received in VA benefits. 
(R. 130.) 
On February 10, 2003, Mr. Evans timely appealed to the Claims Review 
Committee. (R. 125.) Mr. Evans stated that the issues he wished to appeal were set forth 
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in his October 7 letter, which challenged Educators' decision that Mr. Evans' disability 
did not result from performance of his duty and that his benefits under the Plan should be 
offset by his VA benefits. (R. 115-16.) Again, Mr. Evans did not appeal Educators' 
initial decision that his benefits would expire in 24 months. 
On March 5, 2003, the Claims Review Committee affirmed. (R. 82.) The 
March 5 letter informed Mr. Evans, through his counsel, that he had "the right to request 
additional review by the Board of Directors of Educators Mutual. Please follow the 
procedures on the enclosed Claims Review Process." (R. 82.) The copy of the "Claims 
Review Process" attached to the letter made it clear that to appeal a decision of the 
Claims Review Committee, a request for review "must be in writing and must be 
received by Educators, on behalf of the Plan Sponsor, within 30 days after the date of the 
letter indicating the decision of the Claims Review Committee." (R. 83.) 
Mr. Evans, through his counsel, failed to appeal the decision of the Claims Review 
Committee within 30 days. Instead, Mr. Evans' counsel appealed the decision in a letter 
dated May 2, 2003, which was received by Educators on May 5, 2003, a month after the 
deadline. (R. 127.) Thereafter, Educators, in accordance with its fiduciary duty to all 
Plan members, refused to review the issues raised by Mr. Evans. (R. 130.) On May 8, 
2003, Educators informed Mr. Evans that he had failed to set up a repayment plan for the 
overpayments. (R. 130.) Finally, Educators reminded Mr. Evans of his obligation to 
participate in a "Vocational Rehabilitation program," which he had not done. (R. 130.) 
On May 22, 2003, Mr. Evans' counsel stated that he "could not explain" how he 
had missed the 30-day deadline, except that he had "misread the requirements of the 
appeal notice" or "may have skipped a month in calculating the due date." (R. 133.) 
Mr. Evans' counsel candidly admitted, "my mistake caused Mr. Evans to miss the 
deadline." (R. 133.) Later, Mr. Evans' counsel reiterated that is was his mistake that 
caused Mr. Evans to miss the deadline: "For that reason, and for that reason alone, 
Mr. Evans was late in submitting his response to [Educators'] March 5, 2003 decision." 
(R. 139.) Mr. Evans' counsel articulated no good cause for missing the deadline, leaving 
Mr. Evans' recourse with his counsel, not with Educators or the City. 
E. Mr. Evans Fails to Provide Educators Required Medical Information 
Based upon Mr. Evans' failure to appeal the determination that his benefits would 
expire in 24 months, on December 10, 2003, Educators informed Mr. Evans that his 
benefits would end on January 11, 2004, exactly 24 months after the effective date for his 
receiving benefits. (R. 143.) On January 7, 2004, Mr. Evans, through new counsel, 
argued that benefits should not end after 24 months because Mr. Evans is "incapable of 
engaging in any occupation or employment for wage or profit." (R. 147.) 
Because Educators had already determined that Mr. Evans was not eligible for 
benefits beyond 24 months, Educators required additional information to reconsider its 
prior, unchallenged decision. Educators notified Mr. Evans that it would take 30 days to 
review the file, and that, under the terms of the Plan, Mr. Evans must "request all new 
current medical information from all doctors that are treating [Mr. Evans] for his 
disability at this time and who can substantiate that he is totally disabled from any and all 
occupations." (R. 149.) Educators explained that Mr. Evans must provide (i) a "detailed 
statement describing his diagnosis;" (ii) any reports indicating that Mr. Evans had 
undergone "vocational training," as required under the Plan; (iii) current copies of all 
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medical records relevant to the disability; and (iv) any records of his orthopedic surgeon. 
(R. 149.) 
Mr. Evans failed to provide the required information, and therefore, Educators did 
not extend Mr. Evans' benefits beyond 24 months. (R. 796.) On March 22, 2006, after 
the district court had ruled that Educators must first formally deny Mr. Evans5 request to 
extend benefits beyond 24 months, Educators formally denied Mr. Evans' request on the 
ground that he had failed to provide the required information. (R. 706.) Only after the 
March 22, 2006 letter did Mr. Evans provide some of the required information. (R. 708.) 
Educators thereafter denied various appeals on the ground that Mr. Evans had never 
provided all of the required information, and the required information he did provide 
arrived more than 2 years after his benefits had expired. (R. 752.) 
F. The District Court Rejects Mr. Evans' Counterclaims and Awards 
Educators the Amounts It Overpaid Mr. Evans 
On November 18, 2004, Educators filed a breach of contract claim against 
Mr. Evans seeking the $8,510.78 it had overpaid under the Plan. (R. 1.) The basis of 
Educators' claim was the Mr. Evans had failed to inform Educators of his VA benefits 
amounting to $8,510.78. (R. 1-15.) On January 3, 2005, Mr. Evans filed a counterclaim 
for breach of contract based upon Mr. Evans' assertion that Educators could not offset 
benefits under the Plan with his federal disability benefits. (R. 33.) On May 20, 2009, 
the district court entered summary judgment in favor of Educators on the ground that the 
plain terms of the Plan, as well as the 2001 version of the Utah Code relevant to the 
Plan, authorize Educators to offset Mr. Evans' benefits from the City with his "armed 
The law in effect at the time of injury governs a disability claim. Shepherd v. Diversa-
Cvcle Prods.. 725 P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah 1986). 
services retirement or disability program" benefits. (R. 1069.) On August 12, 2009, the 
district court entered judgment in favor of Educators for $8,510.78, including pre- and 
post-judgment interest. (R. 1107.) 
In Mr. Evans' January 3, 2005 counterclaim against Educators, as well as his third 
party complaint against Salt Lake City, Mr. Evans alleged that Educators had breached 
the Plan on two additional grounds: (i) Mr. Evans was entitled to benefits equal to his 
foil salary, not 2/3 of his salary; (ii) Mr. Evans was entitled to receive benefits beyond 24 
months because his disability prevented him from holding any job. (R. 33.) 
On April 7, 2006, the district court ruled that Educators had correctly refused to 
consider Mr. Evans' contention that he was entitled to benefits equivalent to his foil 
salary because Mr. Evans had failed to appeal timely Educators' determination that 
Mr. Evans was entitled to benefits equivalent only to 2/3 of his salary. (R. 576.) And on 
May 21, 2007, the district court ruled that Educators had correctly refused to consider the 
merits of Mr. Evans' contention that his disability precluded him from holding any and 
all occupations because Mr. Evans had failed to provide Educators supporting 
documentation to support that contention as required under the Plan. (R. 796.) 
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Summary of Argument 
This appeal concerns whether Mr. Evans may challenge the merits of the 
following three coverage decisions under Salt Lake City's disability plan, which is 
administered by Educators: (i) Mr. Evans' disability did not result from injuries incurred 
while "on duty;" (ii) Mr. Evans' benefits should be offset by amounts he received in VA 
benefits; and (iii) Mr. Evans' disability merely prevents him from serving as a police 
officer and not from holding any job. Mr. Evans failed to appeal timely those decisions 
and subsequently failed to provide required information with regard to the third decision. 
His failure to comply with the terms of the Plan precludes merits review. Educators did 
not err, let alone act arbitrarily and capriciously, in enforcing the terms of the Plan and 
rejecting Mr. Evans' claims. This provides sufficient ground to affirm. 
Under the Plan, Mr. Evans had 30 days to appeal any decision of the Claims 
Review Committee. On March 5, 2003, the Claims Review Committee affirmed 
Educators' initial decision that (i) Mr. Evans was entitled to benefits equivalent to 2/3 of 
his salary because his disability does not stem from an injury suffered while "on duty;" 
and (ii) Educators could offset Mr. Evans' benefits by amounts he received in VA 
benefits. Mr. Evans, through counsel, failed to appeal the Claims Review Committee's 
decision until May 5, 2003, nearly a month after the 30-day deadline. 
Mr. Evans does not dispute that his appeal was untimely, but instead asks this 
court to require independent plan administrators, like Educators, to ignore such deadlines 
in the plans they administer whenever an employee's failure to comply is reasonable. 
(AOB at 31-32.) Not only should this court decline the invitation to create an exception 
that does not exist in the Plan, but, even if it did, it would make no difference here 
because Mr. Evans' counsel did not articulate "good cause" or reasonable grounds for 
having missed the deadline. Instead, counsel candidly admitted that he simply calendared 
the date incorrectly. Thus, even accepting Mr. Evans' mistaken premise that Educators 
must ignore deadlines when noncompliance is reasonable, this court should still affirm. 
In addition, Mr. Evans' argument concerning the offset of VA benefits is not 
based upon the law in effect as of the date of Mr. Evans' disability, October 22, 2001. 
Under the 2001 version of the Utah Code—with which the Plan had to "substantially 
comply"—any benefit "shall be reduced" by amounts received from "armed services 
retirement or disability programs" or "any employer-paid public or private retirement or 
disability program for which the employee is eligible." Utah Code Ann. §49-9-402(2) 
(2001) (emphasis added). Mirroring this requirement, the Plan required Educators to 
offset any benefits paid to an employee by amounts the employee received for "Armed 
Services retirement or disability programs" or "[a]ny employer paid public or private 
retirement or disability program for which the employee is eligible." (R. 957, 958.) 
Thus, Educators was not just authorized but required to offset Mr. Evans' benefits by the 
amounts he received in VA benefits. Regardless of timeliness issues, then, Mr. Evans' 
arguments concerning the offset fail. 
Finally, Mr. Evans asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his claims 
against the City on the ground that he failed to submit the claims to arbitration required 
by the Plan. Mr. Evans' argument fails because the district court later adjudicated 
Mr. Evans' claims against Educators, which are identical to the claims against the City. 
Therefore, any issue concerning the dismissal of those claims is moot. 
This court should affirm. 
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Argument 
This court can resolve every claim on procedural grounds, just as the district court 
did. Mr. Evans' claims against Educators challenge the amount of benefits Educators 
awarded Mr. Evans under his disability plan with Salt Lake City. Mr. Evans asserts that 
Educators improperly decided that (i) Mr. Evans' disability did not result from "on duty" 
activities; (ii) Educators must offset Mr. Evans' benefits under the Plan with his VA 
benefits; and (iii) Mr. Evans' disability prevents his serving as a police officer, but not 
holding any and all occupations. All three claims fail. First, Mr. Evans failed to take a 
timely appeal from Educators' Claims Review Committee's rejection of his first two 
claims and did not appeal the third claim at all. Second, Mr. Evans later failed to provide 
information required under the Plan to permit Educators to consider his third claim. 
Mr. Evans' failure to comply with the terms of the Plan demonstrates that Educators did 
not err, let alone act arbitrarily or capriciously, in rejecting Mr. Evans' claims. 
Educators overpaid Mr. Evans during the time he failed to inform Educators of the 
amount of his VA benefits. Under the terms of the Plan, Educators is entitled to recover 
the overpayments. Mr. Evans' response is that under the 2002 version of the statute 
governing the State disability plan, Educators could not offset amounts received in VA 
benefits because municipality plans must "substantially comply" with the statute. The 
problem with Mr. Evans' argument is that the statute governing disability benefits is set 
at the date of disability, here 2001. The 2001 version of the statute not only allows the 
offset, but mandates it. This court should affirm not only the district court's rejection of 
Mr. Evans' claims on procedural ground, but also the district court's summary judgment 
in favor of Educators on its overpayment claim. 
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I. Educators Did Not Err, Let Alone Act Arbitrarily and Capriciously, in 
Refusing to Consider Mr. Evans' Untimely Appeal 
Mr. Evans failed to appeal timely Educators' decision that (i) Mr. Evans is entitled 
to 2/3 of his salary because his disability did not occur while "on duty;" and 
(ii) Educators must offset Mr. Evans5 benefits under the Plan by his VA benefits. Under 
the Plan, an employee must appeal a decision by Educators' Claims Review Committee 
within 30 days of its decision. (R. 963-64.) It is undisputed that on March 5, 2003, 
Educators' Claims Review Committee rejected Mr. Evans' arguments concerning the 
amount of his benefit and the offset. (R. 82.) It also is undisputed that Mr. Evans did not 
appeal the Claims Review Committee decision until a month after the 30-day deadline 
expired. (R. 127.) Thus, it is undisputed that Mr. Evans, through his counsel at the time, 
failed to comply with the Plan. 
Mr. Evans nonetheless argues on appeal that Educators acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in enforcing the 30-day appeal deadline in the Plan. (AOB at 31.) 
Mr. Evans first argues that the 30-day deadline is unenforceable because it is 
unreasonable. (AOB at 31.) Mr. Evans then argues that the 30-day deadline was 
equitably tolled. (AOB at 32.) Finally, Mr. Evans argues that the 30-day deadline cannot 
be enforced because it does not appear in the statute authorizing municipalities, like Salt 
Lake City, to have their own disability plans. (AOB at 31.) All three arguments fail. 
First, the 30-day appeal deadline in the Plan is no more unreasonable than the 30-
day appeal deadline in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under the Plan, 
the first appeal to the Claims Review Committee—which may require the gathering of 
additional information—is 60 days, a deadline Mr. Evans satisfied. The second appeal to 
the board of directors—which does not require anything more than a short letter—is 30 
15 
days, a deadline Mr. Evans did not satisfy. The untimely two-page letter by which 
Mr. Evans attempted to appeal to the board of directors reveals that 30 days is a more 
than adequate time period in which to request further review. (R. 127-28.) It does not 
take more than 30 days to draft a two-page letter. 
Perhaps the best indication that the 30-day deadline is not unreasonable is that 
Mr. Evans never claimed that he could not have complied with that deadline, but instead 
his prior attorney candidly explained that he simply calendared the deadline incorrectly. 
Mr. Evans's counsel "could not explain" how he had missed the 30-day deadline, except 
that he had "misread the requirements of the appeal notice" or "may have skipped a 
month in calculating the due date." (R. 133.) Mr. Evans' counsel admitted, "my mistake 
caused Mr. Evans to miss the deadline." (R. 133.) Later, counsel explained, "For that 
reason, and for that reason alone, Mr. Evans was late in submitting his response to 
[Educators'] March 5, 2003 decision." (R. 139.) The timing of Mr. Evans' appeal had 
nothing to do with the reasonableness of the 30-day deadline. It had to do with his prior 
counsel's mistake. 
The fact that it was counsel's mistake that explains Mr. Evans' failure to comply 
with the 30-day deadline also undermines Mr. Evans' second argument, which is 
essentially an equitable tolling argument. Under analogous federal law, in extraordinary 
circumstances equitable tolling can excuse a defective appeal under the terms of a 
disability plan, but equitable tolling does not apply where the employee "made no appeal 
to the Plan, defective or otherwise, within the authorized period." Gayle v. UPS, 401 
F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2005). More to the point here, equitable tolling does not apply 
where an "attorney's negligence alone caused [an] appeal to become untimely."3 LI at 
226-27. Because equitable tolling does not apply, Mr. Evans5 failure to comply with the 
appeal deadline means that he waived his right to judicial review: "No action at law or in 
equity may be brought against the City, Educators, or the Plan Administrator, and no 
arbitration request may be made, until the covered employee has exhausted the Claims 
Review Process as provided in this Plan." (R. 963.) 
Mr. Evans' third argument is that the Plan does not substantially comply with 
statute setting forth the State disability plan4 because the Plan contains deadlines for 
appeals but the State plan contains none. (AOB at 31-32.) This argument fails for two 
reasons. First, the statute requires municipality plans only to be "substantially 
equivalent" to the State plan set forth in Chapter 9 of Title 49. Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-
102 (2001). The Plan need not be identical. The statute's silence concerning appeal 
deadlines does not mean that no deadlines exist—that an appeal can be filed years later— 
but instead merely means that any deadlines must be reasonable. As demonstrated above, 
a 30-day deadline for a second level of review is reasonable, at least as applied in this 
case, where the only explanation for missing the deadline is that Mr. Evans' attorney 
simply calendared the date incorrectly. 
3
 Smaldone v. Senkowskt 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ("This Circuit, 
like her sisters, has found attorney error inadequate to create the 'extraordinary' 
circumstances equitable tolling requires."). The Tenth Circuit has explained that a lack 
of awareness of the law or lack of assistance in collateral review does not constitute the 
type of extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 
F.3d 925, 929-30 (10th Cir. 2008); Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 
2000). 
4
 Under Utah law, political subdivisions are permitted to offer their own disability plans 
as long as their plans are "substantially equivalent to the program offered by the state," 
which is set forth in Utah Code sections 49-9-102 et seq. (2001). 
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Furthermore, the absence of an appeal deadline in the statute is explained by the 
fact that it is the Utah State Retirement Board that makes benefit determinations under 
the State plan, so an appeals procedure specific to the disability plan, as opposed to all 
other decisions made by the retirement board, is unnecessary. Were Mr. Evans correct 
that the absence of an appeal deadline in the statute means municipality plan 
administrators must adjudicate appeals whenever filed, then municipality plans could 
have no deadline at all, meaning Mr. Evans could have appealed the Claims Review 
Committee's decision, e.g., 30 years later. To avoid this absurd result, municipality plans 
can set forth deadlines as long as they are reasonable, which the Plan here did. 
Moreover, the point of requiring a municipality plan to be "substantially similar" is to be 
similar in substance, not similar in procedure, something a municipal plan could never do 
because it is not administered by the Retirement Board. 
For these reasons, this court should reject Mr. Evans' arguments that the 30-day 
appeal deadline is unenforceable or that his failure to comply with it should be excused. 
This court should affirm the district court's ruling that Educators did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously, or err in any way, when it rejected Mr. Evans' appeal to the board of 
directors on the ground that his appeal was untimely. And because Mr. Evans' appeal 
was untimely, the district court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
merits5 of Mr. Evans' contentions that his disability occurred while "on duty" and that 
Educators may offset his benefits under the Plan with his VA benefits. This court should 
affirm. 
5
 "No action at law or in equity may be brought against the City, Educators, or the Plan 
Administrator, and no arbitration request may be made, until the covered employee has 
exhausted the Claims Review Process as provided in this Plan." (R. 963.) 
II. Educators Did Not Err, Let Alone Act Arbitrarily and Capriciously, in 
Denying Mr. Evans' Claim That His Disability Prevents Him From Holding 
Any and All Occupations 
For similar reasons, this court should reject Mr. Evans' claim that his benefits 
should extend beyond 24 months. When Educators initially determined that Mr. Evans9 
benefits would last only 24 months, Mr. Evans did not challenge the decision. Thus, 
when, on January 7, 2004, Mr. Evans sought reconsideration of the decision 24 months 
later, Educators required new information on which to base its review, something 
required under the Plan. Mr. Evans refused to provide the additional information, and, 
therefore, Educators refused to extend his benefits beyond 24 months. After two more 
years had passed, the district court required Educators to reject Mr. Evans' request 
formally, which it did in a March 22, 2006 letter rejecting Mr. Evans' request based upon 
his failure to comply with the Plan in providing additional medical information. Like 
Mr. Evans' failure to comply with the appeal deadline, his failure to comply with the 
terms of the Plan warranted Educators' rejection of his claim. 
At most, Educators was required to engage in a "meaningful dialogue" with 
Mr. Evans and to request additional information that could demonstrate that he qualified 
for benefits. Gaither v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 394 F.3d 792, 807 (10th Cir. 2004). 
Educators did that. In response to Mr. Evans' January 7, 2004 letter claiming that his 
benefits should extend beyond 24 months because he is "incapable of engaging in any 
occupation or employment for wage or profit" (R. 147), Educators explained that 
Mr. Evans had to "request all new current medical information from all doctors that are 
treating [Mr. Evans] for his disability at this time and who can substantiate that he is 
totally disabled from any and all occupations." (R. 149.) Educators further explained 
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that Mr. Evans must provide (i) a "detailed statement describing his diagnosis;" (ii) any 
reports indicating that Mr. Evans had undergone "vocational training," as required under 
the Plan; (iii) current copies of all medical records relevant to the disability; and (iv) any 
records of his orthopedic surgeon. (R. 149.) 
Mr. Evans provided none of this information. Under analogous federal law, where 
a claimant fails to comply with the terms of a disability plan, it is not arbitrary and 
capricious to deny benefits, even if the claimant, unlike Mr. Evans, would have qualified 
for benefits had he complied. Gertjejansen v. Kemper Ins. Cos., 274 F. App'x 569 (9th 
Cir. 2008). In short, Educators properly rejected Mr. Evans' request to extend benefits 
beyond 24 months. 
In response, Mr. Evans asserts that Educators did not need additional information 
to determine that he was disabled from holding any and all occupations, and, therefore, 
his benefits should extend beyond 24 months. (AOB at 36.) Mr. Evans bases this 
assertion on the fact that he had provided medical information about his disability on 
March 28, 2002, nearly two years before his January 7, 2004 request that Educators 
extend his benefits beyond 24 months. In other words, the information was not new and 
certainly did not constitute medical information about Mr. Evans' disability as of January 
2004. The only medical information Mr. Evans provided after he challenged the decision 
in January 2004 was provided more than two years after his benefits expired and after 
Educators formally denied his request to extend benefits because he had failed to provide 
the required medical information. 
Mr. Evans also asserts that he was not afforded a full and fair review of his 
contention that his benefits should extend beyond 24 months. (AOB at 37.) This is 
incorrect. Educators first informed Mr. Evans that his benefits would last only 24 months 
in a letter dated September 10, 2002. Mr. Evans did not appeal that decision. When 
Mr. Evans requested that Educators revisit this issue on January 7, 2004, Educators 
informed Mr. Evans that it required updated medical information. Educators then 
rejected Mr. Evans' request on the ground that he failed to provide that updated medical 
information. There is nothing unfair about that review process. 
The district court correctly rejected Mr. Evans attempt to reopen the issue more 
than 2 years after his benefits expired. Educators did not err, let alone act arbitrarily or 
capriciously, in refusing to extend Mr. Evans' benefits beyond 24 months. This court 
should affirm. 
III. Educators Is Entitled to Recoup Amounts It Overpaid Mr. Evans During the 
Time He Failed to Inform Educators He Was Receiving VA Benefits 
Assuming the court reaches the merits of Mr. Evans' claim that Educators erred in 
offsetting the VA benefits, the court should still affirm the district court's ruling that 
Educators properly offset Mr. Evans' benefits and that Mr. Evans must repay Educators 
overpayments during the time Mr. Evans failed to disclose he was receiving VA benefits. 
Mr. Evans makes a number of arguments concerning offset. First, Mr. Evans argues that 
the 2002 version of the statute setting forth the State plan is the statute with which the 
Plan must "substantially comply," and that statute does not require an offset for VA 
benefits. (AOB at 23-24, 28-29.) Second, Mr. Evans argues that the phrase "armed 
services disability benefits" does not include VA benefits. (AOB at 24-25.) Third, 
Mr. Evans argues that injuries he received during his military service are distinct from 
injuries that caused the disability at issue here. (AOB at 29.) All three arguments fail. 
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As an initial matter, it is worth noting that Mr. Evans' arguments are precisely the 
ones he is precluded from raising because he failed to appeal timely the Claims Review 
Committee's decision, which affirmed Educator's determination that Mr. Evans' benefits 
under the Plan should be offset by his VA benefits. Thus, the issue has already been 
resolved conclusively in Educators' favor. While this provides a sufficient basis for this 
court to affirm, Mr. Evans' claims also fail on their merits. 
Mr. Evan's first argument is that the 2002 statute outlining the State plan governs 
this dispute, even though the date of his injury is 2001. Mr. Evans' argument ignores 
Utah law, which holds that the law in effect at the time of injury governs a disability 
claim. Shepherd v. Diversa-Cvcle Prods., 725 P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah 1986). It is 
undisputed that the time of injury here was October 22, 2001. (R. 948, 950-53.) 
Therefore, only the 2001 statute is relevant to this appeal. 
Under the 2001 version of the Utah Code, any benefit "shall be reduced" by 
amounts received from "armed services retirement or disability programs" or "any 
employer-paid public or private retirement or disability program for which the employee 
is eligible." Utah Code Ann. §49-9-402(2) (2001) (emphasis added). Consistent with 
this, the Plan mandated that Educators offset any benefits paid to an employee by 
amounts the employee received for "Armed Services retirement or disability programs" 
or "[a]ny employer paid public or private retirement or disability program for which the 
employee is eligible." (R. 957, 958.) Thus, under both the Plan and the relevant statute, 
Educators was not only authorized, but required, to offset Mr. Evans' benefits by the 
amounts he received in VA benefits, both because they are "armed services" disability 
benefits and because they are an employer paid public disability program. 
Mr. Evans' second argument is that VA benefits are not a type of "armed services 
disability program." Specifically, Mr. Evans argues that the Department of Defense may 
award a temporary disability benefit during service, so this must be what the legislature 
had in mind when it used the phrase "armed services disability program," instead of 
having in mind the VA benefits program, which compensates the same individuals for the 
same disabilities once they are discharged from the military. (AOB at 25.) First, 
assuming this distinction made sense and were reflected in the statute, Mr. Evans' 
argument still fails because a VA benefit still is a type of employer paid public disability 
program, which also requires an offset.6 
Second, Mr. Evans is incorrect that VA benefits are not a type of armed services 
disability program. This argument ignores reality, as one only becomes a disabled 
veteran by having served in the armed services and become disabled while serving. 
Under Mr. Evans' interpretation, the offset would apply only to active members of the 
armed services, as VA benefits are the only benefits that a former member of the armed 
services can receive for disabilities incurred while on active duty. Feres v. United States, 
340 U.S. 135, 145-46 (1950). The problems with Mr. Evans' interpretation are 
confirmed by the mission statement of the Department of Veterans Affairs: "The mission 
of the Disability Compensation program is to provide monthly payments to veterans in 
recognition of the effects of disabilities, diseases, or injuries incurred or aggravated 
during active military service." http://www.vba.va.gov/bln/21/mission.htm. And the 
United States Supreme Court describes "recoveries [of VA benefits] compare extremely 
6
 As noted above, the plan also mandates that Educators offset any benefits paid to an 
employee by amounts the employee received from "[a]ny employer paid public or private 
retirement or disability program for which the employee is eligible." (R. 957, 958.) 
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favorably with those provided by most workmen's compensation statutes." Feres, 340 
U.S. at 145. 
This perhaps explains why in his answer, Mr. Evans admitted he was "eligible for 
and received benefits from Armed Services retirement or disability programs at certain 
times when he was receiving disability benefits under the Plan." (R. 2, 27.) There is no 
reason to read the statute as encompassing anything other than disability benefits 
provided by the United States for injuries suffered while a member of the armed forces, 
the very interpretation suggested by the plain language of the statute and recognized by 
the district court. 
Mr. Evans' final argument is that the Plan must have automatically renewed in 
2002 to conform with the 2002 version of the statute because the Plan states that it will 
automatically renew each year to conform with any changes in the statute. (AOB at 27.) 
The problem with this argument is the same as that with the first argument: The law in 
effect at the time of injury governs a disability claim. Shepherd v. Diversa-Cycle Prods., 
725 P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah 1986). Benefits are not expanded or contracted with a change 
in the statute, but are governed by the law that was in place when the injury occurred. 
The court should reject the third argument too. Educators properly Mr. Evans' benefits 
under the Plan by his VA benefits. 
IV. Issues Related to the Order Concerning Arbitration Are Moot 
Mr. Evans' final argument is that the district court erred when it dismissed his 
claims against the City on the ground that he failed to submit those claims to arbitration 
as required under the Plan. Mr. Evans argues that Educators, as the City's agent, waived 
the City's right to enforce the arbitration provision by filing this lawsuit to collect 
overpayments. (AOB at 33-35.) To be clear, the position of the City was not that 
Mr. Evans must now arbitrate his claims, but instead was that Mr. Evans had to arbitrate 
his claims previously for exhaustion purposes. With this clarification, Mr. Evans' waiver 
argument is beside the point because no party is moving to compel arbitration. 
In addition, the issue is moot because the district court later adjudicated the same 
claims against Educators, with which the City is in privity. Under Utah law, where 
claims in arbitration and in court overlap, adjudication of one renders the other moot. 
Christiansen .v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2005 UT 21, If 7, 116 P.3d 259. For this reason, this 
court should not reach any issues related to arbitration. State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 
(Utah 1994) ("An issue on appeal is considered moot when the requested judicial relief 
cannot affect the rights of the litigants."). 
Moreover, even if the court reaches the merits, it should reject Mr. Evans' 
argument. The Plan states that "[n]o action at law or in equity may be brought against 
Educators and/or The City until the covered employee has exhausted the administrative 
remedies as provided in the Plan." (R. 963.) Because Mr. Evans failed to submit his 
dispute to arbitration, the district court correctly dismissed his claims against the City. 
This court should affirm. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Evans challenges three coverage decisions under the Plan,: (i) Mr. Evans' 
disability did not originate from injuries incurred while "on duty;" (ii) Mr. Evans' 
benefits should be offset by amounts he received in VA benefits; and (iii) Mr. Evans' 
disability merely prevents him from serving as a police officer, but does not prevent him 
from holding any and all occupations. Mr. Evans failed to appeal timely those decisions 
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and subsequently failed to provide required information with regard to the third issue. 
Mr. Evans' failures to comply with the terms of the Plan preclude merits review of all 
three issues. Educators did not err, let alone act arbitrarily and capriciously, in enforcing 
the express terms of the Plan and rejecting Mr. Evans' claims. And Educators is entitled 
to recoupment of overpayments under the Plan. This court should affirm. 
DATED this 28th day of May, 2010. 
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SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
451 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
(hereinafter referred to as "The City") agrees, subject to the provisions, conditions and 
limitations herein contained and endorsed hereon, to provide this long-term disability plan 
to eligible employees. 
This Plan shall be effective on the i f day of July , 2001, at 12:01 a.m., Mountain Time. 
This Plan will automatically be renewed on its anniversary date for a period of one year, 
unless otherwise terminated by The City. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Salt Lake City Corporation has caused this benefit plan to be 
executed this 1st day of July , 2001, at its office in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The provisions and limitations set forth within this policy are as follows: 
Waiting Period 12 consecutive weeks (based on a seven-
day week) from the last day physically at 
work 
Monthly Benefit 66%% of Covered Monthly Salary, reduced 
by any other income 
100% of Covered Monthly Salary, in line of 
duty, reduced by any other income 
Cost of Living Adjustment Not to exceed a maximum of 3% 
GROUP LONG-TERM DISABILITY PLAN (LTD) 
SELF-FUNDED LONG-TERM DISABILITY 
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SELF-FUNDED LONG-TERM DISABILITY Salt Lake City Corporation • 2001-2002 
DESCRIPTION OF BENEFITS 
Basic Disability Benefits 
Salt Lake City Corporation (hereinafter "The City") will provide benefits as described on the 
face page of this Plan. 
The benefit is 100% of covered monthly salary for eligible employees whose disability occurs in 
the line of duty, reduced by any other income. The benefit is 66 2/3% of covered monthly salary 
for eligible employees whose disability occurs off duty, reduced by any other income. Monthly 
disability benefits paid to eligible employees covered under the public safety retirement system 
are subject to all applicable tax withholdings. Monthly disability benefits paid to any other 
eligible employee are non-taxable. The waiting period is 12 consecutive weeks from the last day 
the covered employee was physically at work, or 12 consecutive weeks of paid short-term 
disability (SDI). 
Benefit Adjustments and Offsets 
Payments due under this policy will be reduced dollar for dollar by income received from any of 
the sources listed below during the period of time for which benefits are paid under this Plan. 
The amount may be estimated by The City or Educators, its designated Plan Administrator, and 
offset from the benefit if a determination has not been made or the actual amount has not been 
identified. The covered employee must notify The City or Educators of any awards or 
determinations by or from any of the agencies, departments, or programs regarding payments to 
the covered employee. The City has the right to recover overpayments or reduce benefits 
allowable under this Plan by the amount the covered employee receives or is eligible to receive 
from any other plan. If the first disability payment is for a portion of a month, then the first 
payment is prorated on the basis of a 30-day month for each.day of disability from the last day of 
the waiting period to the first day of the following month. If the final disability payment is for 
less than an entire month, the final disability payment is prorated on the basis of a 30-day month 
for the number of days of disability. It is the responsibility of the employee to pay any required 
contributions during the waiting period unless The City makes the payment. Payments due 
under this Plan will be reduced by income from any of the following sources: 
• Social Security payable to the covered employee or to the covered employee's 
dependent(s) by reason of the covered employee's disability. If the covered employee or a 
dependent receives a lump-sum payment from Social Security, The City is entitled to 
recover any amount in excess of the amount The City would have paid if benefits had been 
coordinated with Social Security payments. 
• Civil Service retirement or disability programs. 
• Armed Services retirement or disability programs. 
• Any payment from the United States Government, or state or local government agency or 
department thereof, as a result of the covered employee's employment. 
• Any retirement income received from a plan to which The City made contributions. If a 
covered employee is entitled to a lump-sum payment and withdraws all or part of a 
retirement benefit, Educators will apportion the lump sum or retirement benefit on the 
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basis of the estimated number of months the covered employee may continue to receive 
disability payments. The monthly disability benefit will be reduced by the amount of the 
monthly apportionment. 
• Any employer paid public or private retirement or disability program for which the 
employee is eligible. 
• Any other group salary indemnity plan. However, the insured's benefits under this Plan 
will not be offset if the insured purchases supplementary insurance not paid for by the 
policyholder. 
• Any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a third party liable to. 
the employee for the disability. 
• Any disability payment from any group insurance plan providing income benefits for 
which contributions or payroll deductions are or were made by the Employer. 
. * Unemployment compensation benefit. 
Conditions For Receiving Benefits 
« The covered employee will be required to engage In a vocational rehabilitation prqgram if 
it is determined through consultation with the covered employee's physician, rehabilitation 
specialists, and other providers possessing expertise in the cause of the disability, that the 
covered employee will benefit from vocational rehabilitation. If the covered employee is 
or becomes employed during the initial two-year disability period, he will continue to 
receive disability benefits, less an amount equal to 50% of the salary, wage, or income he 
earns, up to 100% of his last working day salary. 
• The covered employee is required to apply for all benefits for which he is or may be 
eligible, including Social Security, Workers' Compensation, retirement, salary indemnity, 
or other insurance benefits. 
• The covered employee is required to provide, or allow others to provide, any information 
relevant to his disability. 
• The covered employee must be under the continuous care of a legally qualified physician 
and must agree to undergo periodic medical examinations as required by Educators. 
• Whenever payments which should have been made under this Plan in accordance with tins 
provision have been made under any other plans, Educators will have the right, exercisable 
alone and in its sole discretion, to pay over to any organization making such other 
payments any amounts it will determine to be warranted in order to satisfy the intent of this 
provision amounts so paid will be deemed to be benefits paid under this Plan, and to the 
extent of such payments, Educators will be fully discharged from liability under this Plan. 
• The City must provide Educators with an income statement necessary to verify the covered 
employee's income within 30 days after receiving written request from Educators. 
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• Upon request, annually Educators may require a copy of the covered employee's federal 
and state income tax return from previous years to verify the covered employee's income. 
• The covered employee may be able to receive or continue to receive benefits under this 
Plan even if this Plan is terminated or the covered employee's coverage under this Plan is 
terminated provided the date of his disability is prior to the termination of this Plan. 
• The covered employee will receive 100% of covered monthly salary, if the disability 
occurs in the line of duty. 
• To be eligible under the 100% of covered salary, line-of-duty benefits, the public safety 
employee must be a "sworn" employee fitting the definitions under Section 77-la-l, 77-la-
2, and 77-1 a~4 of the Utah Code Annotated. Benefits are payable under Sections 49-9-40 
and 49-9-402 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
• All other employees eligible to receive long-term disability benefits under the terms of this 
Plan who do not qualify for the 100% of covered salary, line-of-duty benefits as outlined 
above will be covered for a 66 2/3% of covered salary benefit.. 
Maximum Length of Benefit Payments 
If a covered employee is disabled from performing the duties of the occupation he performed 
before disability, benefits will be paid while the covered employee is totally disabled up to 24 
months, unless disability occurs after the covered employee reaches age 66, in which case the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) rules apply. 
Except for psychological disability, if a covered employee is disabled from performing any and 
all occupations, benefits will be paid while the covered employee is totally and permanently 
disabled, according to ADEA rules: 
Age on the Date Maximum period 
disability commenced payable 
61 or younger up to 65th birthday 
62 42 months 
63 36 months 
64 30 months 
65 24 months 
66 20 months 
67 18 months 
68 15 months 
69 and older 12 months 
Benefits for psychological disability, regardless of cause or origin, will be paid while a covered 
employee is totally disabled up to 24 months. Payment may be extended to five years if the 
covered employee is continuously institutionalized for psychological treatment. All benefits are 
subject to ADEA rules. 
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Benefits for disability related to, but not limited to, Epstein Barr, chronic fatigue, and 
fibromyalgia, regardless of cause or origin, will be paid while a covered employee is totally 
disabled up to a limit of 24 months. 
Successive Disabilities 
If a covered employee elects to return to work during a period of disability, and becomes 
disabled again from the same cause within six months following his return to work, the disability 
will be considered one period of disability and benefits will be reinstated as if the covered 
employee did not return to work. If the disabilities are from totally unrelated causes, they will be 
considered two separate periods of disability. 
To be considered a new period of disability for psychological disability benefits, the covered 
employee must have returned to active, full-time employment for The City for at least two 
consecutive years between psychological disabilities. 
Retirement Service Credit 
If a covered employee is participating in the Utah State Retirement plan, (excluding firefighters 
retirement plan), The City, through Educators, will report years of service accrued during the 
time a covered employee receives LTD benefits. 
When Disability Payments End 
Payments for disability end on the earliest of the following: 
• The date the covered employee is no longer totally disabled. 
• The date of the covered employee's death. 
• The date the covered employee fails to furnish The City or Educators satisfactory proof 
that he continues to be totally disabled. 
• The date the covered employee declines a medical examination by doctors selected and 
approved by Educators. 
• The date the covered employee is eligible to retire without reduction of retirement benefits. 
• The last day of the month the covered employee requests benefits be terminated. 
• The date the covered employee meets the maximum period of benefits outlined under 
"Maximum Length of Benefit Payments." 
Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) 
Disability payments will be adjusted once each year beginning on the first day of the month 
shown on the face page of this policy, by the lesser of the percent increase indicated on the face 
page of this policy or the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics for the preceding 12 months. Cost of living adjustments will not be made unless 
the covered employee has been receiving benefit payments for at least six full months. 
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Tax Withholding (Public Safety Retirement Employees Only) 
The City and/or covered employee are responsible for any taxes that may arise out of benefits 
payable under this Plan, including but not limited to, federal income taxes. At the covered 
employee's request, Educators will reduce the payment to the covered employee by the amount 
of federal tax withholding required to be withheld by the United States government. 
Exclusions 
No benefits will be paid for disability caused by or resulting from: 
• War or any act of war, whether declared or undeclared, active military duty, reserve duty, 
or National Guard service. 
• Attempted suicide or purposely self-inflicted injury, while sane or insane. 
• Any act of aggression committed by the covered employee, or commission or attempted 
commission of a felony or involvement in an illegal occupation. 
• Non-measurable illnesses, regardless of cause or origin. 
• Alcoholism and drug addiction or the use of any narcotics or drug unless administered on 
the advice of and under the direction of a legally qualified physician. 
» Any preexisting condition, until the covered employee has been enrolled in the piogram 
for at least 12 consecutive months. 
> Travel or flight in an aircraft if the employee is a crew member or trainee (except for line 
of duty), lossoGy owner, or test pilot. 
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GENERAL INFORMATION 
Employee Eligibility and Enrollment 
Eligible employees are full-time salaried, or regular part-time employees of Salt Lake City 
Coiporation. Employees must enroll for this coverage, except for sworn officers covered under 
Utah code section 49-9-402 (Public Safety). 
Employees covered under the public safety retirement system are automatically covered under 
this LTD program. The Employer is required by the public safety retirement act to pay the 
premiums for this program. This is an optional program for all other eligible City employees. 
When Coverage Begins 
Coverage becomes effective the first day of the insurance period in which a premium was 
deducted, or as specified by the Employer, unless the covered employee is confined in a hospital 
on that day, in which case, coverage begins on the day the covered employee resumes active, 
full-time employment. 
Preexisting Condition Limitation 
The waiting period for Long-tenn Disability benefits will not begin for any of the following until 
the covered employee has been covered by this Plan for at least twelve full months (beginning 
from the effective date of coverage): 
• A disability which is the result of a complication of a preexisting condition. 
• A disability that occurred within the twelve months before the effective date of coverage 
under this Plan, unless employee enrolls within 60 days from hire date. 
• A disability resulting from an illness or injury that was diagnosed or treated within the 
twelve months before the effective date, 
Termination of Disability Insurance Coverage 
Long-term disability insurance coverage will automatically terminate on the earliest of the 
following: 
• The date The City terminates this Plan. 
• The date the covered employee is no longer actively employed by The City. 
• The date the covered employee is no longer eligible for coverage under this Plan in 
accordance with The City's policies. 
• The date the covered employee is eligible to retire without reduction of retirement benefits. 
• The date contributions, if any, are not paid according to the "Payment of Contributions" 
section of this Plan. 
t The date the covered employee requests coverage be terminated. 
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• The date the insured commits any act of fraud with regard to this policy. 
• The date the covered employee enters the armed forces of any country for active, full-time 
duty. 
How to File a Claim 
• Contact the Human Resource, Benefits Division at 535-7900 for the Long-term Disability 
claim form. 
• Return completed employee LTD claim form to Educators Mutual, 852 East Arrowhead 
Lane, Murray, Utah 84107. 
• It is the covered employees responsibility to have the Physicians section of the LTD claim 
fonn completed by the physician and returned to Educators Mutual, 852 East Arrowhead 
Lane, Murray Utah 84107 with all credible medical evidence that will substantiate his total 
disability from his own occupation within 90 days of the date of his injury or illness 
% (claims received past 90 days may result in an overpayment which will be reduced from 
future benefits). 
• No claim will be acqepted if filed 12 months after date of disability. 
Release of Information 
Enrollment under the Long-term Disability Plan authorizes Educators to release or obtain any 
necessary information from any other insurance companies, or organization or person. Any 
person claiming benefits under this Plan must furnish to Educators any information that may be 
necessary to implement this provision. 
How to Appeal a Denied Claim 
No action at law or in equity may be brought against Educators and/or The City until the 
covered employee has exhausted the administrative remedies as provided in this Plan. 
The covered employee may request a review of any claim that has been denied, in whole or in 
part, by writing to Educators Claims Review Committee. This request must be received within 
60 days after the covered employee receives notice the claim has been denied The Claims 
Review Committee meets on a bimonthly basis and is comprised of at least three employees of 
Educators who did not participate in the initial decision. 
As part of this process, the covered employee should review all pertinent information regarding 
the claim and explain, in writing, his reasons for believing the claim should have been paid. The 
covered employee should also include any additional information that will aid the Claims 
Review Committee in reviewing the claim. 
The Claims Review Committee will inform the covered employee, in writing, of its decision 
following the review. If the claim is denied again, in whole or in part, the covered employee will 
be given specific reasons for the denial. 
If the covered employee does not agree with the findings of the Claims Review Committee, he 
has 30 days after receiving the denial letter to request a review by the Executive Committee of 
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Educators. If the covered employee does not agree with the findings of the Executive 
Committee, he then has 30 days after receiving the decision to request a review by the Board of 
Directors of Educators. If the covered employee is not satisfied with the decision of the Board of 
Directors, and wishes to continue with arbitration, he may make a written request for arbitration 
of the disputed claim within 15 days of receiving the decision. 
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN THE INSURED AND EDUCATORS IS 
SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCATION, A COPY OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE FROM 
EDUCATORS. ALL PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION OF THE 
ARBITRATION COMMITTEE, WHICH IS FINAL. THE ARBITRATION AWARD 
MAY INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES IF ALLOWED BY STATE LAW AND MAY BE 
ENTERED AS A JUDGMENT IN ANY COURT OF PROPER JURISDICTION. 
A request for arbitration must state the specific reason for the request and provide the name of 
one (or more) person(s), including licensed physicians, attorneys, etc., the covered employee 
nominates to the arbitration committee. The covered employee will be entitled to present all 
information records, documents, or other evidence he deems relevant to the disputed claim to the 
arbitration committee through his nominee. 
If the covered employee receives an award less than, or the same as, Educators paid or agreed to 
pay before the request for arbitration, he must pay one-half of the cost of the arbitration 
pioceeding, including physician and witness expenses. If the arbitration award is greater than 
that paid or agreed to by Educators before the request for arbitration, Educators will pay all costs 
of arbitration, except attorneys' fees. 
Subrogation and Recovery 
To the extent permitted by Utah law and to the extent that The City has made payment, the 
covered employee must assign to The City all claims for ambunts that The City has paid or will 
pay, that the covered employee has, may have, or will have against a third party. If covered 
benefits are furnished for bodily injury caused by another person (third party), the covered 
employee must reimburse The City for any expenses recovered from the third party by legal 
judgment, settlement, insurance carrier, or any other means. 
When the covered employee accepts benefits, he automatically assigns subrogation rights to The 
City and authorizes The City to file a legal action against the third party for the benefits paid. 
The City may require the covered employee to sign a formal written assignment before paying 
any claim. Failure by Educators to require a signed subrogation form will not constitute a waiver 
of any of The City's subrogation rights under this Plan or Utah law. 
If The City or Educators has paid amounts for disability resulting from accidental or intentional 
actions, the covered employee must not release or discharge any claims against any responsible 
persons or any entities without written permission from The City or Educators. The covered 
employee must fully cooperate with The City or Educators in pursuing its right of subrogation, 
including, but not limited to, providing The City or Educators with papers and information in his 
possession and giving whatever testimony may be required. 
The City is entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment an covered employee receives 
from any source in connection with disability benefits resulting from accidental or intentional 
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actions, up to the amount of benefits paid by The City or Educators, whether or not the covered 
employee is made whole by such recovery and whether ornot such recovery includes any 
amount (in whole or in part) for services, supplies or accommodations covered under this Plan. 
The City is entitled to subrogate against benefits payable under premise provisions of 
homeowner's or business owner's insurance policies up to the amount of benefits paid. 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Actively at work or active work means being in attendance at the customary place of 
employment, performing the duties of employment on a full-time basis, and devoting full efforts 
and energies in the employment. An employee will be deemed actively at work on each day of a 
regular paid vacation, or on a non-working day on which he is not disabled, if he was actively at 
work on the last preceding regular working day. 
Contract year means the 12-month period following the effective date indicated on the face page 
of this Plan and any 12-month period following that anniversary date. 
Covered employee means a regular full-time employee whose position regularly requires 40 
hours per week on a full-time schedule and a regular part-time employee whose position 
regularly requires 20 hours or more, but less than 40 hours per week, on a part-time schedule. 
Covered monthly salary means the lesser of the contracted income paid to the employee during 
the month preceding the month he became disabled, or the contracted annual salary income at the 
time the employee became disabled, divided by twelve. All other income, wages, or salary the 
employee received from The City for extracurricular duties, including overtime, are not 
considered part of the covered monthly salary. Covered monthly salary also excludes income 
from other employment of any nature if the salary is paid under a separate contract, or as an 
addendum to the regular employment contract, unless expressly included as an amendment to 
this Plan. 
Disability or disabled means the complete inability due to a medically determinable physical or 
mental impainnent to engage in the employee's regular occupation during the elimination period 
and the first 24 months of disability. Thereafter, total disability means the complete inability, 
based solely on medically determinable physical impairment, to engage in any gainful 
occupation which is reasonable, considering the employee's education, training, and experience. 
Total disability exists only if during any period of total disability the employee is under the 
regular care of a legally qualified physician other than the employee. 
Employer means Salt Lake City Corporation ("The City"). 
Full-time basis or full-time employment means employment as defined by The City. 
He or him includes and means she or her. 
Institutionalized means a person is continuously confined in a state hospital, private hospital or 
other institution licensed primarily for the treatment of patients with psychological conditions. 
Line of duty means performing assigned work duties fitting the definition in Sections 77-la-l, 
77-la-2, and 77-la-4 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
Line of duty disability means a physical injury resulting from external force or violence as a 
result of the performance of assigned work duties. 
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Maximum benefit period means the duration of time the covered employee is eligible to receive 
long-term disability benefits as specified for the age of the covered employee at the time of 
disability. 
Non-measurable illness means anything that cannot be proven anatomically through any type of 
testing, labs, x-rays, etc. No measurable symptoms of illness. 
Plan Administrator means Educators Administrative Services, Inc. 
Plan year means the 12-month period following the effective date indicated on the face page of 
this Plan and any 12-month period following that anniversary date. 
Preexisting condition means an illness, injury, or related medical condition that developed 
within the twelve months before enrollment in this Plan. A preexisting condition is also defined 
as a condition that exhibited itself or existed before the beginning date of coverage. 
Provider means a practitioner of the healing arts operating within the scope of his license, i.e., 
physician, registered nurse, chiropractor, anesthetist, etc. Provider also means a facility 
operating within the scope of its license. 
Psychological or Psychiatric disability means a mental illness whether or not the illness is 
caused by an underlying physiological or organic condition. 
Regular occupation means the duties, responsibilities, or assignments a covered employee 
ordinarily performs for The City. 
Rehabilitation employment means any occupation or employment for salary, income or profit 
the covered employee is reasonably qualified for and in which the covered employee is engaged 
while unable to perform his regular occupation as a result of illness or injury. Any employment 
must be approved by Educators for the purposes of this Plan. 
Subrogation means the assignment of any rights and benefits the covered employee has or may 
have against any third party, up to the amount of benefits for which The City is liable under this 
Plan. 
Summary of Benefits means the outline of benefits as established by this Plan. 
M'aiting period means the length of time following the date a covered employee becomes 
disabled before disability benefits begin, as stated on the face page of this Plan. If the first 
disability payment is for a portion of a month, then the first payment is prorated on the basis of a 
30-day month for each day of disability from the last day of the waiting period to the first day of 
the following month. If the final disability payment is for less than an entire month, the final 
disability payment is prorated on the basis of a 30-day month for the number of days of 
disability. It is the responsibility of the covered employee to pay any required contributions 
during the waiting period unless The City makes or waives the payment. 
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PLAN SPONSOR INFORMATION 
TWs Plan, the application of The City, and the eligibility report of the employees constitute the 
entire contract. 
This Plan contains all agreements and understandings of the parties. The Plan supersedes and 
replaces all previous agreements between the parties, any obligation to pay claims under 
previous agreements and any sums due between the parties under previous agreements, shall not 
continue under this Plan. 
Any provision of this Plan that, on the effective date, conflicts with any applicable state statutes, 
is amended to conform to the minimum requirements of such statutes. 
This Plan, when issued and countersigned, will be delivered to The City and will be kept on file 
at The City's principal office. This policy may be inspected by any employee during The City's 
regular business hours. 
Educators will furnish a summary of benefits to The City to be delivered to each covered 
employee. The summary of benefits will describe the essential features of the insurance 
coverage. 
Any person claiming benefits under this Plan authorizes Educators to release or obtain any 
necessary information from any other insurance company or other organization or person. Any 
person filing a claim with Educators must furnish Educators information that may be necessary 
to implement this provision. 
Amendments 
This Plan may be amended at any time, without the consent of the covered employees or their 
beneficiaries. However, no change in this Plan is valid until it is approved by Educators and the 
amendment is endorsed and signed by The City and Educators. All endorsements by Educators 
must be signed by the president. No agent or person other than the president has authority to 
change this Plan or to waive any of its provisions. Amendments will not apply to claims arising 
prior to the amendment's effective date. 
Educators may not make changes in this Plan to create less favorable terms or higher rates until 
at least 60 days after written notice of the proposed change is delivered or sent by first class mail 
to The City, except as provided in the Utah State Insurance Code. Benefit changes to this Plan 
will apply to all covered employees on the date amended benefits become effective. 
In the absence of fraud, all statements made by The City or by a Covered Person are 
representations and not warranties, and no statement made for the purpose of effecting insurance 
will void this Plan or reduce benefits unless contained in writing and signed by The City or the 
covered employee. The covered employee, his beneficiary, or assignee has the right to make 
written request to Educators for a copy of the application. 
After two years from the date of application by the covered employee, no misstatements (except 
fraudulent misstatements made by the employee on the application for this Plan) will be used to 
void this Plan or to deny a claim for loss incurred, as defined in this Plan. 
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Payment of Contributions 
The City may require contributions from covered employees who elect to participate in this Plan. 
All contributions due under this Plan, including any adjustments, are payable by the covered 
employee to The City or to Educators. 
For individuals insured after this Plan's effective date, the contribution charged will commence 
on the first day their coverage becomes effective. The payment of any contribution will not 
maintain the benefits of this Plan beyond the day immediately preceding the next due date. 
A 31-day grace period will be granted for payment of contributions accrued after the first 
contribution has been paid. During the grace period, this coverage will remain in force, but the 
covered employee will be liable to The City for contributions accrued during that period. 
Contribution adjustments (whether the result of error, administrative delay, or any other cause) 
requiring the return of unearned contributions to the covered employee, must be requested within 
12 months after the contribution was paid. The City or Educators may request evidence that an 
adjustment is necessary. In no case will The City or Educators consider a refund for more than 
the 12-month period prior to the request. 
If the covered employee is responsible for payment of any or all of the contribution, an overdue 
contribution that is unpaid or covered by any note or written order may be deducted from the 
payment of benefits under this Plan. 
Eligibility and Enrollment 
The City will provide Educators with the names of the employees initially eligible, the 
employees who become eligible, and the employees whose coverage terminates before 
termination of this Plan. The City must also provide the respective dates and other data, 
including current salary information, necessary to administer this Plan. Failure to report the 
termination of coverage of any covered employee will not continue coverage beyond the date of 
termination. 
Educators will maintain a record that shows the names of all covered employees, the date each 
employee became covered, the effective date of any change in coverage, and other such 
information required to administer this Plan. Educators will furnish a copy of these records to 
The City, upon reasonable request. 
The City's inadvertent errors or failure to report a change in a covered employee's coverage or 
the name of any employee who is eligible for coverage, will not deprive the employee of 
coverage or affect the coverage. 
Renewal Dates 
This Plan will automatically be renewed on its anniversary date for a period of one year, unless 
otherwise terminated by The City. 
Plan Sponsor Responsibility 
Any qualified employer or group of employees in the State pf Utah may become a Plan Sponsor. 
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The City will provide Educators with the eligibility report with the names of the employees 
initially eligible, the employees who become eligible, and the employees whose insurance 
teiminates before termination of this Plan. The City must also provide the respective dates and 
other data necessary to administer this Plan. Failure to report the termination of insurance of any 
employee will not continue coverage beyond the date of termination. 
The City's inadvertent errors or failure to report a change in an employee's coverage or the name 
of any employee who is eligible for insurance, will not deprive the employee of insurance or 
affect the coverage. 
Termination of Contract 
The City may terminate this Plan by giving at least 30 days written notice to Educators prior to 
any anniversary date, if funds are not appropriated for the fiscal policy year. 
If The City does not give notice of termination and does not pay the administrative fee within the 
grace period, The City will be liable to Educators for payment of all administrative fees due, 
including costs, interest, and reasonable attorney's fees incurred for collection of the 
administrative fees. 
Educators may terminate this Plan on any date the administrative fee is due by giving The City at 
least 30 days written notice. 
On termination of this Plan by either The City or Educators, The City will be liable for the 
payment of eligible benefits incurred after the termination date, if the illness or injury occurred 
prior to the termination date. 
Gifts 
Educators represents that it has not:(l) provided an illegal gift or payoff to an Employer officer 
or employee or fonner Employer officer, or his or her relative or business entity; (2) retained any 
person to solicit or secure this contract upon an agreement or understanding for a commission, 
percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee, other than bona fide employees or bona fide 
commercial selling agencies for the purpose of securing business; (3) knowingly breached any of 
the ethical standards sot forth in the Employer's conflict of interest ordinance, Chapter 2.44, Salt 
Lake City Code; or (4) knowingly influenced, and hereby promises that it will not knowingly 
influence, an Employer officer or employee or former Employer officer or employee to breach 
any of the ethical standards set forth in the Employer's conflict of interest ordinance, Chapter 
2,44, Salt Lake City Code. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
A member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** ARCHIVE DATA*** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2001 2ND SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2001 UT 98 AND 2001 UT APP 329. *** 
TITLE 49. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 
CHAPTER 9. UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' DISABILITY ACT 
PARTI. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-102 (2001) 
§49-9-102. Purpose 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide long-term disability benefits for employees of employers partici-
pating in any system administered by the board except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement 
Act, or employees covered undef the Public Safety Retirement Act who are covered under a long-term dis-
ability program offered by a political subdivision which is substantially equivalent to the program offered by 
the state under this chapter. The program shall be administered by the executive officer of the board through 
the retirement office, under the policies and rules promulgated by the board. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,49-9-102, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 1, § 166; 1987, ch. 111, § 1. 
NOTES: CROSS-REFERENCES. -Appointment of executive director of board, § 49-1-203(1). 
Firefighters' Retirement Act, Chapter 5 of this title. 
Public Safety Retirement Act, Chapter 4 of this title. 
Retirement office, § 49-1-201. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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*** ARCHIVE DATA*** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2001 2ND SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2001 UT 98 AND 2001 UT APP 329. *** 
TITLE 49. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 
CHAPTER 9. UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' DISABILITY ACT 
PARTI. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-103 (2001) 
§49-9-103. Definitions 
(1) "Date of disability" means the date on which a period of continuous disability commences, and may not 
commence on or before the last day of actual work. 
(2) "Educational institution" means a political subdivision or an instrumentality of a political subdivision, 
an instrumentality of the state, or any combination of these entities, which is primarily engaged in educa-
tional activities or the administration or servicing of educational activities. The term includes the State Board 
of Education and any instrumentality of the State Board of Education, institutions of higher education and 
their branches, school districts, and vocational and technical schools. 
(3) "Elimination period" means the three months at the beginning of each continuous period of total dis-
ability for which no benefit will be paid and commences with the date of disability. 
(4) "Employee" means any regular full-time employee of an employer who participates in any system 
administered by the board, except those employees exempt from coverage under Section 49-9-102. 
(5) "Maximum benefit period" means the maximum period of time the monthly disability income benefit 
will be paid for any continuous period of total disability. 
(6) "Medically determinable impairment" means an impairment that results from anatomical, physiologi-
cal, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory di-
agnostic techniques. A physical or mental impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting of 
signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by the individual's statement of symptoms. 
(7) "Physician" means a legally qualified physician. 
(8) "Rehabilitative employment" means any board-approved occupation or employment for wage or 
profit, for which the employee is reasonably qualified by education, training, or experience, in which the em-
ployee engages while unable to perform his occupation as a result of injury or illness. 
Utah Code Ann. §49-9-103 
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(9) "Total disability" means the complete inability, due to medically determinable physical or mental im-
pairment, to engage in the employee's regular occupation during the elimination period and the first 24 
months of disability benefits. Thereafter, "total disability" means the complete inability, based solely on 
medically determinable physical impairment, to engage in any gainful occupation which is reasonable, con-
sidering the employee's education, training, and experience. "Total disability" exists only if during any period 
of "total disability" the employee is under the regular care of a physician other than the employee. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,49-9-103, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 1, § 167; 1987, ch. 111, § 2; 1994, ch. 270, § 1; 
1995, ch. 197, § 22; 1996, ch. 79, § 63; 1999, ch. 292, § 19; 2000, ch. 283, § 8. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "three 
months" for "five months" in Subsection (3). 
The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, added "regular full-time" in Subsection (2), added "based 
solely on physical impairment" in Subsection (7), and made related changes. 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, rearranged the definitions in alphabetical order. 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 19, 1999, added Subsection (6), making related designation 
changes, and in Subsection (9) substituted the language beginning "medically determinable" and ending "not 
less than 12 months" for "injury and illness" in the first sentence and inserted "medically determinable" in the 
second sentence. 
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 2000, deleted "but is not limited to" after "term includes" in the 
second sentence of Subsection (2) and "which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months" after "mental impairment" in the first 
sentence of Subsection (9). 
CROSS-REFERENCES. -State Board of Education, § 53A-1-101 et seq. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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TITLE 49. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 
CHAPTER 9. UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES1 DISABILITY ACT 
PART 2. THE PROGRAM AND FUND 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-203 (2001) 
§ 49-9-203. Eligibility for membership in the program 
(1) All employers participating in any system administered by the board may cover their employees under 
this chapter, except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement Act. 
(2) If an employer elects to cover any of his eligible employees under this chapter, all of those employees 
shall be covered, except employees covered under the Firefighters' Retirement Act. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter requires any political subdivision or educational institution to be covered by 
this chapter. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,49-9-203, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 1, § 170; 1987, ch. 111, § 3; 1991, ch. 282, § 1; 
1992, ch. 157, §27. 
NOTES: CROSS-REFERENCES. -Firefighters' Retirement Act, Chapter 5 of this title. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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TITLE 49. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 
CHAPTER 9. UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' DISABILITY ACT 
PART 4. BENEFITS 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-401 (2001) 
§ 49-9» 101 I hsftbiiih, kitdifs Proof required - Eligibility 
(1) Upon receipt of proof by the board from the employer that an employee has become totally disabled as 
a result of: 
(a) accidental bodily itiftiPv ulntli is the sole cause of disability and is sustained while this chapter is in 
force; 
(b) disease or illness causing total disability commencing while this chapter is in torce; or 
(c) physical injury resulting from external force or violence as a result of the performance of duty, the 
fund will pay to the employee a monthly disability benefit for each month the total disability continues be-
yond the elimination period, not to exceed the maximum benefit period. 
(2) Successive periods of disability which: (a) result from the same or related causes, (b) are separated by 
less than six months of continuous full-time work at the individual's usual place of employment, and (c) 
commence while the individual is an employee covered by this chapter, shall be considered as a single period 
of disability. The inability to work for a period less than 15 consecutive days may not be considered as a pe-
riod of disability. Otherwise, successive periods of disability shall be considered as separate periods of dis-
ability. 
(3) I he board may, at any time, have any employee claiming disability examined by a physician chosen 
by the board to determine if the employee is disabled, and if so, the extent of the disability. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), any claim brought by an employee for long-term disabil-
ity benefits under the Public Employee's Disability Program is barred if it is not commenced within one year 
from the employee's date of disability. 
(b) If an employee fails to commence a claim for long-term disability benefits within the time limita-
tions prescribed by Subsection (4)(a), the board may permit an employee to commence a claim for long-term 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-401 
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disability benefits if the employee demonstrates that under the surrounding facts and circumstances the em-
ployee's failure to comply with the time limitations was reasonable. 
(5) Benefits for disability based primarily on psychopathy shall be determined in accordance with Sec-
tion 49-9-406. 
(6) Medical or psychological conditions which existed prior to enrollment shall not be a basis for disabil-
ity benefits until the employee has had one year of continuous enrollment in the Public Employees Long-
Term Disability Program. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,49-9-401, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 1, § 172; 1987, ch. 111, § 4; 1995, ch. 197, § 23; 
1998, ch. 267, § 10; 1999, ch. 292, § 20. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, added Subsection (4) and 
made punctuation corrections. 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsection (5). 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 19, 1999, made two minor stylistic changes in Subsection (4) and 
added Subsection (6). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. -Social security: right to disability benefits as affected by refusal to submit to, or cooperate in, medi-
cal or surgical treatment, 114 A.L.R. Fed. 141. 
NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE 
REVISION OF TITLE.Laws 1987, Ch. 1 repealed the former provisions of this title and enacted the present 
provisions, effective July 1, 1987.For a table showing the placement in revised Title 49 of provisions from 
the former title, see the Table of Corresponding Sections following this title. 
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TITLE 49. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 
CHAPTER 9. UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'DISABILITY ACT 
PART 4, BENEFITS 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-402 (2001) 
§ 49-9-402. Calculation of" disabiliiv beneflf Reduction of benefit Cii ci it nstances ~ Eligibility foi bene 
fits - Application required 
(1) (a) The monthly income disability benefit is two-thirds of the regular monthly salary paid as of the last 
day of actual service for the disabilities defined in Subsections 49-9-401 (l)(a) and (b) and 100% of the regu-
lar monthly salary paid as of the last day of actual service for the disabilities defined in Subsection 49-9-
401(l)(c). 
(b) Payments may not be made by the fund for any period of disability unless the employee is under the 
regular care and treatment of a physician. 
(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or due to, the 
employee from the following sources for the same period of time during which the employee is entitled to 
receive the monthly disability benefit: 
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by the employee, the employee's spouse, and the 
employee's dependent children, except that if Social Security benefits are increased to compensate for a 
change in the Consumer Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may not be further reduced, but 
shall only be offset by benefits determined at the level in effect at the time of the commencement of benefits; 
(b) workers' compensation; 
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs; 
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs; 
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan providing disability income benefits for which 
contributions or payroll deductions are made by the employer; 
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or disability program for which the employee is eli-
gible; 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-402 
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(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a third party liable to the em-
ployee for the disability; and 
(h) unemployment compensation benefits. 
(3) Any amounts received by, or payable to, the employee from one or more of the sources under Sub-
section (2) shall be considered as amounts received by the employee whether or not the amounts were actu-
ally received by the employee. 
(4) (a) In order to be eligible for benefits under this chapter the employee shall first apply for all disabil-
ity benefits from governmental entities under Subsection (2) to which the employee is or may be entitled. 
(b) The employee shall also first apply at the earliest eligible age for all retirement benefits to which 
the employee is or may be entitled. 
(c) If the employee fails to apply, the board may apply on behalf of the employee. 
(d) The board may treat as income any amount the employee is entitled to receive but does not receive 
because application for benefits is not made by the employee and may reduce the monthly disability accord-
ingly. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,49-9-402, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 1, § 173; 1987, ch. 111, § 5; 1989, ch. 81, § 22; 
1994, ch. 90, § 24; 1995, ch. 197, § 24; 1996, ch. 231, § 22. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1994 amendment, effective March 16, 1994, added the (a) and (b) 
designations in Subsection (1) and the (a) to (d) designations in Subsection (4); substituted "If for "In the 
event" at the beginning of the second sentence of Subsection (2)(a); and rewrote Subsection (2)(f). 
The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, added Subsection (2)(h) and made related and stylistic 
changes. 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, added "employer-paid" in Subsection (2)(f). 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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TITLE 49. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT AC 1 
CHAPTER 9. UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' DISABILITY ACT 
PART 4. BENEFITS 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-403 (2001) 
§ 49-9-403. Termination of disability benefits - Calculation of retirement benefit 
(1) Any member, including an employee who relinquishes rights to retirement benefits pursuant to Section 
49-1-405, who applies and is qualified for disability benefits shall receive a disability allowance until the 
earlier of: 
(a) the date the member or employee who relinquishes rights to retirement benefits has accumulated: 
(i) 20 years of service credit if the member is covered by Chapters 4 or 4a, Public Safety Retirement 
and Noncontributory Retirement Acts; 
(ii) 25 years if the member is covered by Chapter 6, Judges' Retirement Act; or 
(iii) 30 years if the member is covered by Chapters 2 or 3, Public Employees' Retirement and Non-
contributory Retirement Acts; or 
(b) the member has received disability benefits for the following applicable time periods: 
(i) if the member is under age 60, the disability allowance is payable until age 65; 
(ii) if the member is 60-61, the disability allowance is payable for five years; 
(iii) if the member is 62-63, the disability allowance is payable for four years; 
(iv) if the member is 64-65, the disability allowance is payable for three years; 
(v) if the member is 66-68, the disability allowance is payable for two years; and 
(vi) if the member is age 69 or older, the disability benefit is payable for one year. 
(2) Upon termination of disability benefits, the disabled employee shall retire under the retirement sys-
tem which covered the employee at the time of disability. The final average salary used in the calculation of 
the retirement benefit shall be based on the annual rate of pay at the time of disability, improved by the an-
Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-403 
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nual cost-of-living increase factor applied to retired participants in the system which covered the employee at 
the time of disability. Retirement credit shall accrue during the period of disability unless the disabled em-
ployee is exempted from the system. 
(3) An employee who is in a position covered by a system administered by the board, but has relin-
quished rights to retirement benefits pursuant to Section 49-1-405, may receive the benefit the employee 
would have received by full participation in the system covering the employee on the date of disability, ex-
cept for the accrual of service credit, in accordance with this title. 
(4) An employee receiving disability benefits who has years of service credit from two or more systems 
or plans administered by the board may not combine these credits under Section 49-1-406 in determining 
eligibility for retirement, unless the employee would receive a greater retirement benefit by combining such 
credits. 
HISTORY: C. 1953,49-9-403, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 1, § 174; 1987, ch. 111, § 6; 1993, ch. 108, § 4; 
1995, ch. 197, § 25; 1999, ch. 292, § 21. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, added the language be-
ginning with "including" and ending with "Section 49-1-405" in Subsection (1), added "or employee who 
relinquishes rights to retirement benefits" in Subsection (l)(a), and added Subsection (3). 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 19, 1999, added Subsection (4). 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chap-
ter, subtitle, or title. 
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Prepared by: 
Curtis J. Drake (0910) 
Stewart 0 . Peay (9584) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association 
Sjf 
APR - 7 2006 
SALT LAKE CO'JNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SVI I I t h M OUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 040924591 
Honorable L.A. Dever 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association's ("Educators") Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment ("Educators' Motion") and Joel Evans' Motion for Partial Summaiy Judgment 
("Evans' Motion") came on for regularly scheduled hearing on Febniai \ 1 <>, ?«)<»(» a I 
approxjiiuilrl) I i HO A m Educators was represented by Stewart O. Peay and Mr. Evans was 
represented by Brian S. King and Nicole T. Durrant. Based upon the record evidence, 
memoranda and arguments of counsel, JIUI fni j'oi <l i aiist ,ho\< m 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Educators' Motion is granted, in part, and denied in part. With respect to Mr. 
Evans' cause of action that he is entitled to receive 100% of his salary for disability benefits 
received from Educators between January 2002 and January 2004, Educators' Motion is granted. 
The court finds that there are no material issues of disputed fact on this point. Mr. Evans failed 
to comply with the contractual requirements of the disability benefits policy administered by 
Educators for Salt Lake City Corporation (the "Plan"). Mr. Evans cannot attempt to recover 
under the Plan when he failed to comply with the Plan by failing to appeal within the 30 days 
required by the Plan. Therefore, his failure to abide by the Plan's dispute resolution process bars 
him from recovery under the Plan to this claim. 
2. Educators Motion is denied, in part, with respect to Mr. Evans' claim that he is 
entitled to disability benefits for the period after January 2004. Mr. Evans timely appealed 
Educators' decision to deny benefits after January 2004 but Educators has not notified Evans of 
its decision regarding that appeal. 
3. Mr. Evans' Motion is denied with respect to his claim that Educators erred in 
offsetting the benefits he was to receive under the Plan with those he was receiving from the 
Veterans' Administration. The court finds that there are issues of material fact on this issue. 
Specifically, whether the Plan is substantially similar to Utah Code Ann. § 49-21, et seq. 
4. Mr. Evans' Motion also petitioned this court for summary judgment on two other 
issues, namely, whether Mr. Evans became disabled in January 2002 as a result injuries sustained 
in the line of duty and whether Mr. Evans is totally and completely disabled from "any and all 
occupations" and is therefore entitled to disability benefits from Educators after January 2004. 
Mr. Evans' counsel, Mr. King, took the position at oral argument that he believed there were 
issues of material fact regarding these claims. Therefore, Mr. Evans Motion is denied with 
respect to these causes of action. 
DATED this day of Match. , 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Curtis J. Drake 
Stewart O. Peay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association 
£- ' S. c 
Brian S. King 
Nicole T. Durrant 
Counsel for Defendant ,m<l Counterclaimant Joel Evans: 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAtL^Mttcou^ r \ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT ~~~~Qf 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
JOEL EVANS, 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Counterclaim Defendant, 
and 
SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 040924591 
JUDGE L.A. DEVER 
Third Party Defendant. 
Educators Mutual v Evans Page 2 Minute Entry 
This matter is before the Court on Third Party Defendant Salt Lake City 
Corporation's Motion For Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the parties' 
pleadings and the relevant legal authorities, the Court now rules as stated herein and 
grants Salt Lake City Corporation's motion. 
As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (UCA § 63-30-1 et. seq.) does not apply to plaintiff's contract claims. 
As set forth under UCA §63-30d-301, in contract actions, waivers of immunity may 
excuse a plaintiff from statutory notice of claim requirements. See, Canfield v Lavton 
City 2005 UT 60; 122 P.3d 622 (Utah 2005). However, to the extent that Mr. Evans has 
asserted any cause(s) of action that do not sound in contract, the City's motion is 
granted due to Mr. Evans' failure to file a notice of claim. 
With regard to the issue of arbitration, the Long Term Disability ("LTD") Plan 
governing this case went into effect on July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002. Thus, Utah 
Administrative Code R590-215-1 et seq., which plaintiff relies upon in support of claim 
against arbitration, is unavailing because such Rule was not enacted until May 20, 
2003. Additionally, the Rules relied upon by plaintiff are further inapplicable to this case 
because they apply only to individual and group policies that were issued or renewed on 
or after July 1, 2002. R590-215-3(1). For these reasons, the Court concludes that the 
arbitration provisions were consistent with and enforceable under the relevant Utah law 
and administrative rules. 
Accordingly, the Court grants third party defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's 
Educators Mutual v Evans Page 3 Minute Entry 
Motion For Summary Judgment and requests that its counsel prepare an Order 
consistent with this Minute Entry. 
Dated this l & day of June, 2006. 
L A D 
DIST 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MINUTE 
ENTRY, to the following, this 1^1 Day of June, 2006: 
J. Wesley Robinson 
451 South State Street 
City & County Building, Room 505 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brain S. King 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Curtis J. Drake 
Stewart O. Peay 
Snell & Wllmer 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004 
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J. WESLEY ROBINSON, #6321 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
Room 505, City and County Building 
451 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 535-7788 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
| ORDER ON SALT LAKE CITY CORP.'S 
v. | MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, | 
Defendant. I 
JOEL EVANS, 
| Case No. 040924591 
Third Party and I 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 1 JUDGE L.A. DEVER 
v. I 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE j 
COMPANY, i 
Counterclaim Defendant, I 
and I 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, I 
Third Party Defendant. I 
nlt&&iHm«wi WHIT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 7 2006 
SALT LAKE COUNTY / y ^ 
Deputy Clark 
1 
This matter came before the Court on Third Party Defendant Salt Lake City 
Corporation's ("the City") Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant and Third 
Party Plaintiff Joel Evans ("Evans") filed a memorandum opposing the City's 
Motion, the City filed a Reply memorandum, and submitted the matter to the Court 
for decision. 
Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings and the relevant legal authorities, 
the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated June 10, 2006. Consistent with that 
Minute Entry, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, DECREED AND ORDERED: 
1. The parties do not dispute that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.) does not apply to Evans' contract claims. 
However, to the extent that Evans has asserted any cause(s) of action that do not 
sound in contract, the City's motion is granted due to Evans' failure to file a notice of 
claim. 
2. The City's Long Term Disability Plans ("LTD Plan") governing this 
case went into effect on July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002. Because the administrative 
rules relied upon by Evans were either not enacted during the relevant time periods or 
do nut applv iv ihe relevant lime periods, ihe arbitration provisions of the City's LTD 
Plan were consistent with and enforceable under the relevant Utah law and 
administrative rules. 
3. Based on the foregoing, the City's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
hereby GRANTED in its entirety. Evans' Third Party Complaint against the City is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2 
DATED this is v\ dayoOtme,2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED: 
BRIAN S. KING 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Third Party Plaintiff Joel Evans 
:URTIS J. DRAKE 
STEWART O. PEAY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff kri3 Counterclaim 
Defendant Educators Mutual Ins Co. 
DATED: 
3 
TabF 
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MM 2 12007 
^^COUNTY, 
prepared by: 
Brian S.King, #4610 
Nicole T. Durrant, #8803 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1739 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1936 
brian@,briansking.com 
nicole(g),briansking.com 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant 
ORDER GRANTING EDUCATORS 
MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATIONS' 
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
JOEL EVANS, 
Third Party and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
and 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Case No. 040924591 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Third Party Defendant, 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association ("Educators") Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Educators' Renewed Motion") has been evaluated based on the record evidence, memoranda 
submitted by the parties and without oral argument. Now, based on this information and for good cause 
appearing, the Court rules as follows: 
Joel Evans did not provide supporting documentation in a timely manner in connection with his 
appeal as required by the terms of the Salt Lake City Corporation's Long Term Disability Insurance 
Program ("the Program"). Consequently, as to Evans' claim for long term disability benefits due to his 
inability to work in any occupation, the Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by the 
Plaintiff in this case is granted. 
However, based on the Court's earlier ruling, dated April 6, 2006, there remains the issue of 
whether Educators is entitled to offset from Evans' disability benefits payments made to him by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. The Court, by previous Order, ruled that whether the Program's terms 
were "substantially similar" to the requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 49-21 et seq., as required by 
U.C.A. § 49-21-201(6), was a question of fact that could not be resolved on summary judgment. 
The parties are directed to work together to establish a scheduling order for resolution nfthf* 
remaining issues in the case. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 2007. 
Approved as to form: 
Curtis J. Drake 
Stewart O. Peay 
TabG 
M i l DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 27 2009 
,W" COUNTY 
Deputy dlork 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
RULING 
Case No.: 040924591 
Judge: L A DEVER 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant's 
Request to Submit for Decision its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
November 28, 2008. Having reviewed Plaintiff's Motion and Defendant's Opposition 
thereto, the Court makes the following findings. 
Plaintiffs basis for its Renewed Motion is that in their original filings of cross-
motions for summary judgment, the parties relied on the incorrect governing statute. 
As a result of the parties' mutual error, this Court entered an Order on September 18, 
2008. Plaintiff now seeks relief from the Order pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 60(b). See 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation 
omitted) ("[A] motion under Rule 54(b) is a proper vehicle to ask the court to reconsider 
its prior denial of a motion for summary judgment"). 
Plaintiff maintains that the appropriate statute that should be considered is Utah 
Code Annotated Section 49-9-402 (2001 )1, because Defendant became disabled in 
October 2001. See Utah Constr. Co. v. Matheson. 534 P.2d 1238,1239 (Utah 1975) 
("[T]he obligation to pay compensation is governed by the law at the time the injury 
occurred" (emphasis in original)). The parties originally relied on Section 49-21-402 
(2002)2. Therefore, relying on the 2001 statutory language, Plaintiff asserts that 
Provides in relevant part: 
(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any amount 
received by, or due to, the employee from the following sources for the same 
period of time during which the employee is entitled to receive the monthly 
disability benefit: 
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by the employee, the 
employee's spouse, and the employee's dependent children, except that 
if Social Security benefits are increased to compensate for a change in 
the Consumer Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may not 
be further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits determined at the 
level in effect at the time of the commencement of benefits; 
(b) workers' compensation; 
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs; 
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs; 
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan providing disability 
income benefits for which contributions or payroll deductions are made by 
the employer; 
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or disability program for 
which the employee is eligible; 
(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a 
third party liable to the employee for the disability; and 
(h) unemployment compensation benefits. 
(emphasis added). 
2Provides in relevant part: 
(2) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or payable to, the 
eligible employee from the following sources for the same period of time during which the eligible 
employee is entitled to receive a monthly disability benefit: 
(a) Social Security disability benefits, including all benefits received by the eligible 
employee, the eligible employee's spouse, and the eligible employee's dependent 
children; 
2 
Defendant's benefits should be reduced by the amount Defendant was receiving from 
Veteran's Affairs, $8,510.78, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. 
Defendant argues that the 2002 version applies because (1) under the Group 
Long-Term Disability Plan ("Plan") Defendant had a twelve week elimination period 
which he was required to fulfill before receiving benefits and, (2) Defendant's employer, 
Salt Lake City Corporation, paid Defendant his full salary until June 2002, three months 
after the effective date of the 2002 statute. Furthermore, Defendant claims that 
pursuant to the law of the case doctrine this Court has discretionary power to decline or 
reopen a matter before final judgment. See IHC v. D&K Mgmt,. Inc., 2008 UT 36, fl27, 
606 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 ("[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, 'a decision made on an 
issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation/ 
(footnote omitted). Thus, the doctrine allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the 
same case once the court has ruled on them. In this way, the law of the case doctrine 
acts much like the doctrine of res judicata-furthering the goals of judicial economy and 
finality—but within a single case"). 
In amending the 2001 statute, the Utah State Legislature was clear that its goal 
was not to modify the outlined benefits, rather it was to clarify the language. H.B. 250, 
(b) workers' compensation indemnity benefits; 
(c) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a third party liable to 
the employee for the disability; 
(d) unemployment compensation benefits; 
(e) automobile no-fault, medical payments, or similar insurance payments; and 
(f) any other disability benefits resulting from the disability for which benefits are being 
received under this chapter. 
(emphasis added). 
3 
54th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2002). Even if the Court were to disregard the General 
Session information, reading the 2001 and 2002 statutes, the language of the statutes is 
consistent. 
Because the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit a court from correcting an 
error, Trembly. 884 P.2d at 1311, the Court STRIKES its Order of September 18, 2008. 
Additionally, if Defendant was receiving benefits from Veteran's Affairs for the same 
disability he was receiving benefits for under the Plan, Plaintiff is entitled to have that 
amount offset. Therefore, Defendant is ORDERED to provide to Plaintiff within ten (10) 
days any information of a separate disability, if such exists. Upon the conclusion of that 
time, Plaintiff or Defendant may submit to the Court for its final ruling on the matter. 
Dated this 26th day of January, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
LADEVEF . , 
DISTRICT COURT j ( M 0 E ^ / ^ / 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT L A K ? ^ 6 $ ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
AMENDED RULING 
Case No.: 040924591 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Because the intent of the Court's position was not clear in the Ruling entered 
January 27, 2009, specifically the last paragraph, the Court STRIKES that Ruling and 
issues the following Amended Ruling. 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant's 
Request to Submit for Decision its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
November 28, 2008. Having reviewed Plaintiffs Motion and Defendant's Opposition 
thereto, the Court makes the following findings. 
Plaintiff's basis for its Renewed Motion is that in their original filings of cross-
motions for summary judgment, the parties relied on the incorrect governing statute. 
As a result of the parties' mutual error, this Court entered an Order on September 18, 
2008. Plaintiff now seeks relief from the Order pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 60(b). See 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306,1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation 
omitted) ("[A] motion under Rule 54(b) is a proper vehicle to ask the court to reconsider 
its prior denial of a motion for summary judgment"). 
Plaintiff maintains that the appropriate statute that should be considered is Utah 
Code Annotated Section 49-9-402 (2001 )\ because Defendant became disabled in 
October 2001. See Utah Constr. Co. v. Matheson, 534 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Utah 1975) 
("[T]he obligation to pay compensation is governed by the law at the time the injury 
occurred" (emphasis in original)). The parties originally relied on Section 49-21-402 
1
 Provides in relevant part: 
(2) The monthly disability income benefit shall be reduced by any amount 
received by, or due to, the employee from the following sources for the same 
period of time during which the employee is entitled to receive the monthly 
disability benefit: 
(a) Social Security, including all benefits received by the employee, the 
employee's spouse, and the employee's dependent children, except that 
if Social Security benefits are increased to compensate for a change in 
the Consumer Price Index, the monthly disability income benefit may not 
be further reduced, but shall only be offset by benefits determined at the 
level in effect at the time of the commencement of benefits; 
(b) workers1 compensation; 
(c) armed services retirement or disability programs; 
(d) civil service retirement or disability programs; 
(e) disability benefits under any group insurance plan providing disability 
income benefits for which contributions or payroll deductions are made by 
the employer; 
(f) any employer-paid public or private retirement or disability program for 
which the employee is eligible; 
(g) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a 
third party liable to the employee for the disability; and 
(h) unemployment compensation benefits. 
(emphasis added). 
2 
(2002)2. Therefore, relying on the 2001 statutory language, Plaintiff asserts that 
Defendant's benefits should be reduced by the amount Defendant was receiving from 
Veteran's Affairs, $8,510.78, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. 
Defendant argues that the 2002 version applies because (1) under the Group 
Long-Term Disability Plan ("Plan") Defendant had a twelve week elimination period 
which he was required to fulfill before receiving benefits and, (2) Defendant's employer, 
Salt Lake City Corporation, paid Defendant his full salary until June 2002, three months 
after the effective date of the 2002 statute. Furthermore, Defendant claims that 
pursuant to the law of the case doctrine this Court has discretionary power to decline or 
reopen a matter before final judgment. See IHC v. D&K Mqmt. Inc., 2008 UT 36,1J27, 
606 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 ("[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, 'a decision made on an 
issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.' 
(footnote omitted). Thus, the doctrine allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the 
same case once the court has ruled on them. In this way, the law of the case doctrine 
2
 Provides in relevant part: 
(2) The monthly disability benefit shall be reduced by any amount received by, or payable to, the 
eligible employee from the following sources for the same period of time during which the eligible 
employee is entitled to receive a monthly disability benefit: 
(a) Social Security disability benefits, including all benefits received by the eligible 
employee, the eligible employee's spouse, and the eligible employee's dependent 
children; 
(b) workers' compensation indemnity benefits; 
(c) any monies received by judgment, legal action, or settlement from a third party liable to 
the employee for the disability; 
(d) unemployment compensation benefits; 
(e) automobile no-fault, medical payments, or similar insurance payments; and 
(f) any other disability benefits resulting from the disability for which benefits are being 
received under this chapter. 
(emphasis added). 
3 
acts much like the doctrine of res judicata-furthering the goals of judicial economy and 
finality—but within a single case"). 
In amending the 2001 statute, the Utah State Legislature was clear that its goal 
was not to modify the outlined benefits, rather it was to clarify the language. H.B. 250, 
54th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2002). Even if the Court were to disregard the General 
Session information, reading the 2001 and 2002 statutes, the language of the statues is 
consistent. 
Because the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit a court from correcting an 
error, Trembly. 884 P.2d at 1311, the Court STRIKES its Order of September 18, 2008. 
Additionally, if Defendant was receiving benefits from Veteran's Affairs while he was 
also receiving benefits under the Plan, Plaintiff is entitled to have that amount offset. 
The Court initially Ordered Defendant to submit any information of a separate 
disability within ten (10) days of entry of the Ruling entered January 27, 2009. The 
implication of the initial order was that if Defendant had two separate disabilities then it 
was acceptable to receive benefits under the Plan, in addition to the benefits Defendant 
was receiving from Veteran's Affairs. That was not the intent of the Court's Order. 
Such a concept was not before the Court for consideration. 
Because the issue before the Court was which version of the statute was 
applicable to the matter, the Court's Order was premised on the fact that if the 
Defendant had a disability which arose after the amendment date then the Court would 
consider the amended statute in its review. However, since the Court finds that both the 
intent of the 2001 and 2002 versions of the statutes are consistent, i.e., benefits 
4 
received from an "armed services or disability program" may be offset against any 
disability benefits paid pursuant to the Plan, the Court enters Plaintiffs Proposed Order 
as the correct interpretation of the Court's ruling. 
Dated this 20th day of May, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
L A DEVER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
~-c< 
^ v 
*
,S3i.- , '- '"J 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling dated this 
20th day of May, 2009, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Curtis J. Drake 
Stewart O. Peay 
Snell & Wilmer, LLP 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Brian S. King 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDUCATORS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
JOEL EVANS, an individual, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
ORDER ON PARTIES' 
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND EDUCATORS MUTUAL 
[INSURANCE ASSOCIATION'S RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040924591 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association ("Educators") and Joel Evans (uMr. Evans") 
filed their cross motions for summary judgment on May 2, 2008. This Court issued an order 
denying those motions on September 18, 2008. Pursuant to Educators' October 3, 2008 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court struck the September 18, 2008 Order in its 
Ruling of January 26,2009. This Court now enters this order to resolve all three of the pending 
>962913 
motions in this case. Based upon the record evidence, memoranda and arguments of counsel, the 
Court finds as follows: 
1. Mr. Evans received disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs 
which is an "armed services retirement or disability program" within the meaning of and under 
the 2001 version of Salt Lake City Corporation's Self Funded Long-Term Disability Program 
("Plan") and Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-402 (2001), the Utah Public Employees' Disability Act 
("Act"). 
2. Benefits from an "armed services retirement or disability program" may be set off 
against disability benefits paid pursuant to the Plan or the Act. 
3 The Plan is consistent with Act with respect to Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-402 
(2001). 
4 Educators and Mr. Evans are bound by the terms of the 2001 versions of the Plan 
and the Act. 
5 Neither the Plan nor the Act requires that, in order to offset benefits under the 
Plan or the Act, the disabilities for which the covered person is receiving disability benefits from 
an "armed services retirement or disability program" are the same disabilities for which the 
covered person is receiving disability benefits under the Plan or the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Educators' May 2, 2008 Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Educators' 
November 28,2008 Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. 
9962913 
? 
DATED this JP_ day of 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
L.A. 
Third 
9962913 
